In the Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election (based on preference orders), a preferred candidate p, and a budget. The goal is to ensure that p wins by shifting p higher in some voters' preference orders. However, each such shift request comes at a price (depending on the voter and on the extent of the shift) and we must not exceed the given budget. We study the parameterized computational complexity of Shift Bribery with respect to a number of parameters (pertaining to the nature of the solution sought and the size of the election) and several classes of price functions. When we parameterize Shift Bribery by the number of affected voters, then for each of our voting rules (Borda, Maximin, Copeland) the problem is W[2]-hard. If, instead, we parameterize by the number of positions by which p is shifted in total, then the problem is fixed-parameter tractable for Borda and Maximin, and is W[1]-hard for Copeland. If we parameterize by the budget, then the results depend on the price function class. We also show that Shift Bribery tends to be tractable when parameterized by the number of voters, but that the results for the number of candidates are more enigmatic.
Introduction
Rank aggregation and election-winner determination are of key importance in various economical and political settings. For instance, there are product rankings based on comparing their prices, their features, and different tests (performed by various institutions such as foundations, journals, etc.); universities are judged based on multiple different criteria (e.g., the number of students per faculty member, availability of particular facilities, the number of Nobel prize winners employed etc.); sport competitions involve multiple rankings (for example, a Formula 1 season consists of about twenty races, each resulting in a ranking of the drivers); and political elections require members of the society to express preferences regarding the participating candidates. In each of these cases the provided rankings are aggregated into the final one, often of significant importance (for example, customers decide on their purchases based on product rankings, students pick the best-ranked universities, the Formula 1 world champion is the driver who comes out first in the aggregated ranking, and the most appreciated candidate becomes the country's president). A sophisticated way of dealing with rankings based on multiple different criteria is to compute a consensus ranking using preference-based rank aggregation methods. 1 In order to affect the outcome of the rank aggregation one has to influence the component rankings obtained from different sources (different product tests, different judgment criteria, different races, different voters). Clearly, the cost of influencing may differ from source to source and, indeed, can sometimes be quite high. Nonetheless, the effect of improved position in the final ranking can be very beneficial.
In this work, we study the computational complexity of affecting the outcome of the rank aggregation by "bribing" specific agents to change their rankings. Moreover, replacing "bribery" with "product development," or "university expansion," or "training," or "political campaigning" we see that our work is relevant to all the settings mentioned above; the particular entities (companies offering their products, universities, drivers, politicians) can find out how much effort they need to invest in order to achieve a better position in the aggregated ranking (or maybe even become the winner). A natural and simple model in this context, using the formalisms of voting theory, is Shift Bribery as introduced by Elkind et al. [23] . We extend their studies in terms of charting the border of computational worst-case tractability, herein putting particular emphasis on the voter-specific "shifting prices" (how expensive it is to shift a candidate by x positions "up").
Informally (see Section 3 for a formal definition), Shift Bribery is the following decision problem. 2 
Shift Bribery
Input: An election, that is, a set of candidates and a set of voters, each with a linear preference order over the candidate set, some preferred candidate p, and some budget. Question: Can we make p win by bribing voters to shift p higher in their preference orders by "paying" no more than the given budget?
Our problem models the situation where we approach each of the voters, one-on-one, and try to convince 3 him or her to rank p higher. Naturally, the effect (the number of positions by which p is shifted in each voter's preference order) depends on the voter's character and situation, and on the amount of effort we invest into convincing the voter. This "effort" could, for example, mean the amount of time spent, the cost of implementing a particular change, or, in the bribery view of the problem, the payment to the voter. Thus, the computational complexity of the problem depends on the voting rule used in the election, on various election parameters such as the number of candidates and voters, and on the type of price functions describing the efforts needed to shift p up by a given number of positions in the voters' preference orders. Our goal is to unravel the nature of these dependencies.
Related Work. The computational complexity of bribery in elections was first studied by Faliszewski et al. [27] . They considered the Bribery problem, where one asks if it is possible to ensure that a given candidate is an election winner by changing at most a given number of votes. Its priced variant, $Bribery, is the same except that each voter has a possibly different price for which we can change his or her vote. These problems were studied for various election rules, including Borda [27, 14] , Copeland [28] , and Maximin [30] (see Section 2 for exact definitions of these rules). Notably, the destructive variant of the Bribery problem (known under the name Margin of Victory), where the goal is to ensure that a despised candidate does not win (and which was studied, e.g., by Magrino et al. [37] and Xia [44] ) has a surprisingly positive motivation-it can be used to detect fraud in elections.
The above problems, however, do not take into account that the price of bribing a voter may depend on what vote we wish the "bribed" voter to cast. For example, a voter might be perfectly happy to swap the two least preferred candidates but not the two most preferred ones. To model such situations, Elkind et al. [23] introduced the Swap Bribery problem. They assumed that each voter has a swap-bribery price function which gives the cost of swapping each two candidates (provided they are adjacent in the voter's preference order; one can perform a series of swaps to transform the voter's preference order in an arbitrary way). They found that Swap Bribery is both NP-hard and hard to approximate for most well-known voting rules (essentially, because the Possible Winner problem [35, 45, 6, 4] , which is NP-hard for almost all natural voting rules, is a special case of Swap Bribery with each swap costing either zero or infinity). Motivated by this, Dorn and Schlotter [19] considered the parameterized complexity of Swap Bribery for the case of t-Approval (where each voter gives a point to his or her top t candidates). On the other hand, Elkind et al. [23] also considered Shift Bribery, a variant of Swap Bribery where all the swaps have to involve the preferred candidate p. They have shown that Shift Bribery remains NP-hard for Borda, Copeland, and Maximin, but that there is a 2-approximation algorithm for Borda and a polynomial-time algorithm for the t-Approval voting rule. Shift Bribery was further studied by Elkind and Faliszewski [22] , who viewed it as a political campaign management problem (and whose view we adopt in this paper), and who gave a 2-approximation algorithm for all scoring rules (generalizing the result for Borda) and other approximation algorithms for Copeland and Maximin. Then, Schlotter et al. [43] have shown that Shift Bribery is polynomial-time solvable for the case of Bucklin and Fallback voting rules.
Based on the idea of modeling campaign management as bribery problems, other researchers introduced several other types of bribery problems. For example, Schlotter et al. [43] introduced Support Bribery and Baumeister et al. [5] introduced Extension Bribery (both problems model the setting where voters cast partial votes that rank some of their top candidates only, and the briber extends these votes; they differ in that the former assumes that the voters know their full preference orders but do not report them completely and the latter assumes that the voters have no preferences regarding the not-reported candidates).
There is quite a lot of research on various other algorithmic aspects of elections. Reviewing this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, but we point the readers to some of the recent surveys [9, 17, 29, 24, 10] .
Our Contributions. For the cases of Borda, Copeland α , and Maximin rules, Elkind et al. [22, 23] have shown that Shift Bribery has high worst-case complexity, but that one can deal with it using polynomial-time approximation algorithms. To better understand where the intractability of Shift Bribery really lies in different special cases, we use another approach of dealing with computationally hard problems, namely parameterized complexity analysis and, more specifically, the notion of fixed-parameter tractability and correspondingly developed exact algorithms. For instance, almost tied elections are tempting targets for Shift Bribery. An exact algorithm which is efficient for this special case may be more attractive than a general approximation algorithm. In close-to-tied elections it might suffice, for example, to contact only a few voters or, perhaps, to shift the preferred candidate by only a few positions in total. Similarly, it is important to solve the problem exactly if one has only a small budget at one's disposal. This is captured by using various problem parameterizations and performing a parameterized complexity analysis.
Furthermore, it is natural to expect that the computational complexity of Shift Bribery depends on the nature of the voters' price functions and, indeed, there is some evidence for this fact: For example, if we assume that shifting p by each single position in each voter's preference order has a fixed unit price or, at the very least, if functions describing the prices are convex, then one can verify that the 2-approximation algorithm of Elkind and Faliszewski [22] boils down to a greedy procedure that picks the cheapest available single-position shifts until it ensures the designated candidate's victory (such an implementation would be much faster than the expensive dynamic-programming algorithm that they use, but would guarantee a 2-approximate solution for convex price functions only). On the contrary, the hardness proofs of Elkind et al. [23] all use a very specific form of price functions which we call all-or-nothing prices, where if one decides to shift the preferred candidate p in some vote, then the cost of this shift is independent of how far one shifts p. In effect, one might as well shift p to the top of the vote. See Section 3 for the definitions of the different price functions that we study.
We combine the above two sets of observations and we study the parameterized complexity of Shift Bribery for Borda, Maximin, and Copeland α , for parameters describing the number of affected voters, the number of unit shifts, the budget, the number of candidates, and the number of voters, under price functions that are either all-or-nothing, sortable, arbitrary, convex, or have a unit price for each single shift. The three voting rules that we select are popular in different kinds of elections apart from political ones. For instance, Borda is used by the X.Org Foundation to elect its board of directors, its modified variant is used within Formula 1 World Championship (and numerous other competitions including, e.g., ski-jumping, and song contests). A slightly modified version of Copeland is used to elect the Board of Trustees for the Wikimedia Foundation.
We summarize our results in Table 1 , and we discuss them throughout the paper. In short, it turns out that indeed both the particular parameters used and the nature of the price functions have strong impact on the computational complexity of Shift Bribery. Three key technical contributions of our work are: [2] , XP, and FPT-AS are provided in Section 2. Note that when speaking of an FPT-AS result we mean a result for the optimization version of Shift Bribery where the goal is to minimize the budget.
3. a partial kernelization (polynomial-time data reduction) result for the parameter "number of unit shifts".
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present preliminary notions regarding elections and parameterized complexity theory. In Section 3 we formally define the Shift Bribery problem, together with its parameterizations and definitions of price functions. Our results are in Section 4 (parameterization by solution cost) and Section 5 (parameterization by election size). We discuss an outlook of our research in Section 6. In the appendix we provide those proofs that were omitted from the main part for the sake of readability.
Preliminaries
Below we provide a brief overview of the notions regarding elections and parameterized complexity theory.
Elections and Voting Rules
We use the standard, ordinal model of elections where an election E = (C, V ) consists of a set C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } of candidates and a set V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } of voters. Each voter v provides a preference order over C, i. e., a linear order ranking the candidates from the most preferred one (position 1) to the least preferred one (position m). For example, if C = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }, then writing v : c 1 ≻ c 2 ≻ c 3 indicates that voter v likes c 1 best, then c 2 , and then c 3 . For two candidates c i , c j and voter v we write v : c i ≻ c j to indicate that v prefers c i to c j . Further, we write ≻ v to denote voter v's preference order. Given an election E, for each two candidates c and d, we define N E (c, d) to be the number of voters in E who prefer c over d.
A voting rule R is a function that given an election E outputs a non-empty set ∅ = R(E) ⊆ C of the tied winners of the election. Note that we use the nonunique-winner model, where each of the tied winners is considered a winner and we disregard tie-breaking. This is a standard assumption in papers on bribery in elections [27, 23, 22, 43, 19, 5] . However, we mention that various types of tie-breaking can sometimes affect the complexity of election-related problems quite significantly [41, 42, 26, 18] . Furthermore, we implicitly assume that all voting rules that we consider are anonymous, i.e., their outcomes depend only on the numbers of voters with particular preference orders and not on the identities of the particular voters that cast them. We consider Borda, Maximin, and the Copeland α family of rules. These rules assign points to every candidate and pick as winners those who get most; we write score E (c) to denote the number of points candidate c ∈ C receives in election E-the particular voting rule used to compute the score will always be clear from the context.
Let E := (C, V ) be an election. Under Borda, each candidate c ∈ C receives from each voter v ∈ V as many points as there are candidates that v ranks lower than c. Formally, the Borda score of candidate c is score E (c) := d∈C\{c} N E (c, d). Similarly, the Maximin score of a candidate c is the number of voters who prefer c to his or her "strongest competitor." Formally, for Maximin we have score E (c) := min d∈C\{c} N E (c, d).
Under Copeland α with α being a rational number, α ∈ [0, 1], we organize a head-to-head contest between each two candidates c and d; if c wins (i.e., if N E (c, d) > N E (d, c)) then c receives one point, if d wins then d receives one point, and if they tie (i.e., N E (c, d) = N E (d, c)) then they both receive α points. Formally, Copeland α assigns to each candidate c ∈ C score:
Typical values of α are 0, 1/2, and 1, but there are cases where other values are used. All our results that regard Shift Bribery for Copeland α hold for each rational value of α. For brevity's sake, we write "Copeland" instead of "Copeland α for arbitrary rational number α" throughout this paper.
Conventions for Describing Preference Orders
Given a subset A of candidates, unless specified otherwise, we write A to denote an arbitrary but fixed preference order over A. We write ←− A to denote the reverse of A . If A is empty, then A means an empty preference order.
Let A and B be two disjoint subsets of candidates which do not contain our preferred candidate p (i.e., p / ∈ A ∪ B). Let d, g, z / ∈ A ∪ B be three distinct candidates. We write point-pair(p, A, d, g, B, z) to denote the following two preference orders:
With these two preference orders, under the Borda rule we achieve the effect that candidate d gains one point more than every other candidate in A ∪ B ∪ {p, z} and two points more than candidate g. Observe that p is ranked first in the first preference order and in order to let d's score decrease (by shifting p forward), one has to shift p by |A| + 1 positions in the second vote. This is crucial for some of our reductions. Consider a set A = {a 1 , . . . , a 2x+1 } of candidates. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2x, set A i := {a (i+1) mod (2x+1) , . . . , a (i+x) mod (2x+1) }. For each candidate a i , we write half-seq1(A, a i ) and half-seq2(A, a i ) to denote the following two preference orders, respectively:
Under these two preference orders, we achieve the effect that candidate a i wins head-to-head contests against exactly half of the other candidates (namely, those in A i ) and ties with all the remaining ones. All the other pairs of candidates tie in their head-to-head contests.
Parameterized Complexity
We point the reader to standard text books for general information on parameterized complexity [20, 31, 40] . There are also general accounts on the applications of parameterized complexity theory to computational social choice [9, 12] .
To speak of parameterized complexity of a given problem, we declare a part of the input as a parameter (here we consider numerical parameters only, e.g., for Shift Bribery it could be the number of candidates or the budget; see the next section). We say that a problem parameterized by k is fixed-parameter tractable, that is, is in FPT, if there exists an algorithm that given input I with parameter k gives a correct solution in time f (k) · |I| O(1) , where f (k) is an arbitrary computable function of k, and |I| is the length of the encoding of I. To describe the running times of our algorithms, we often use the O * (·) notation. It is a variant of the standard O(·) notation where polynomial factors are omitted. For example, if the algorithm's running time is f (k) · |I| O(1) , where f is superpolynomial, then we would say that it is O * (f (k)).
Parameterized complexity theory also provides a hierarchy of hardness classes, starting with W [1] , such that FPT ⊆ W[1] ⊆ W[2] ⊆ . . . ⊆ XP. For our purposes, it suffices to define the W-classes through their complete problems and an appropriate reducibility notion. Definition 1. Let A and B be two decision problems. We say that A reduces to B (in a parameterized way) if there are two functions g 1 and g 2 such that, given instance I A of A with parameter k A , it holds that:
ii) g 1 is computable in FPT time (for parameter k A ).
W [1] is the class of problems that reduce to Clique, and W [2] is the class of problems that reduce to Set Cover-in both problems we take solution size k as the parameter. In effect, these two problems are complete for these two classes.
Clique
Input: An undirected graph G = (V (G), E(G)) and a non-negative integer k ≥ 0. Question: Does G contains a clique of size k, that is, a subset Q ⊆ V (G) of k vertices such that for each two distinct vertices u, w ∈ Q one has {u, w} ∈ E(G)?
Note that even though we use letters V and E to denote, respectively, voter sets and elections, when we speak of a graph G, we write V (G) to denote its set of vertices and E(G) to denote its set of edges.
Set Cover
Input: A family S = (S 1 , . . . , S m ) of sets over a universe U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } of elements and a non-negative integer k ≥ 0. Question: Is there a size-k set cover, that is, a collection Q of k sets in S whose union is U?
For problems where an FPT algorithm and a hardness proof are elusive, one can at least try to show an XP algorithm whose running time is polynomial if one treats the parameter as a constant. As opposed to FPT, the degree of the polynomial describing the "XP" running time can depend on the parameter.
Shift Bribery
Given a voting rule R, in R Shift Bribery the goal is to ensure that a certain candidate p (the preferred candidate) is an R-winner of the election. To achieve this effect, we can shift p forward in some of the voters' preference orders. Each shift may have a different price, depending on the voter and on the length of the shift. The problem was defined by Elkind et al. [23] . Here we follow the notation of Elkind and Faliszewski [22] ; see the introduction for other related work.
The Problem
Let E = (C, V ) be some election, where C = {p, c 1 , . . . , c m } and V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }; p is the preferred candidate. A Shift Bribery price function π i for voter v i ∈ V , π i : N → N, gives the price of shifting p forward in v i 's preference order a given number of positions. We require that π i (0) = 0 and that π i (ℓ) ≤ π i (ℓ + 1) for each ℓ ∈ N. We also assume that if p is ranked on a position r in the preference order, then π i (ℓ) = π i (ℓ − 1) whenever ℓ ≥ r. In other words, it costs nothing to keep a voter's preference order as is, it never costs less to shift p farther, and we cannot shift p beyond the top position in the preference order. For instance, let v i be a voter with preference order v i : c 1 ≻ c 2 ≻ p ≻ c 3 and let π i be v i 's Shift Bribery price function. Then, by paying π i (1) we can change v i 's preference order to c 1 ≻ p ≻ c 2 ≻ c 3 , and by paying
It is clear that we need at most |C| − 1 values to completely describe each Shift Bribery price function. We write Π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) to denote the list of Shift Bribery price functions for the voters in V .
A shift action #» s is a vector (s 1 , . . . , s n ) of natural numbers, describing how far p should be shifted in each of the n voters' preference orders. We define shift(E, #» s ) to be the election E ′ = (C, V ′ ) identical to E except that p has been shifted forward in each voter v i 's preference order by s i positions. If that would mean moving p beyond the top position in some preference order, we shift p up to the top position only. We write Π( #» s ) = n i=1 π i (s i ) to denote the price of a given shift action. A shift action s is successful if p is a winner in the election shift(E, #» s ). The term unit shift refers to shifting p by one position in one preference order.
Given the above notation, the decision variant of R Shift Bribery is defined as follows.
R Shift Bribery
Input: An election E = (C, V ) with voter set V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, a list Π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) of Shift Bribery price functions for V , a candidate p ∈ C, and an integer B ∈ N. Question: Is there a shift action #» s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) such that Π( #» s ) ≤ B and p is an R-winner in shift(E, #» s )?
The optimization variant is defined analogously, but we do not include the budget B in the input and we ask for a shift action #» s that ensures p's victory while minimizing Π( #» s ). For an input instance I of the optimization variant of R Shift Bribery, we write OPT(I) to denote the cost of the cheapest successful shift action for I (and we omit I if it is clear from the context). We sometimes also write "R Shift Bribery" when we refer to the optimization variant (and this is clear from the context).
An FPT-approximation scheme (FPT-AS) with parameter k for R Shift Bribery is an algorithm that, given an instance I = (C, V, Π, p) and a number ε > 0, returns a successful shift action #» s such that Π( #» s ) ≤ (1 + ε)OPT(I). This algorithm must run in time f (k, ε)(|I|) O(1) , where f is a computable function depending on k and ε.
Parameters for Shift Bribery
So far, Shift Bribery has not been studied from the parameterized complexity theory point of view. Dorn and Schlotter [19] and Schlotter et al. [43] have, however, provided parameterized complexity results for Swap Bribery and for Support Bribery.
We consider two families of parameters, those referring to the properties of the successful shift action that we seek and those describing the input election. Regarding the first group, we study: Figure 1 : The Hasse diagram of the inclusion relationship among the price function families (for a given election) that we study.
All-or-nothing prices. A Shift Bribery price function π is all-or-nothing if there is a value c such that π(0) = 0 and for each ℓ > 0, π(ℓ) = c (this value c can be different for each voter). Interestingly, the NP-hardness proofs of Elkind et al. [23] use exactly this family of price functions (without referring to them directly, though). All-or-nothing price functions are a special case of what we would intuitively call concave functions.
Convex prices. We are also interested in convex price functions; π is convex if for each ℓ, π(ℓ + 1) − π(ℓ) ≤ π(ℓ + 2) − π(ℓ + 1) (provided that it is possible to shift the preferred candidate by up to ℓ + 2 positions in the given preference order).
Unit prices. To capture the setting where each unit shift has the same cost for each voter, we define the price functions by setting π(ℓ) := ℓ for each ℓ such that p can be shifted by ℓ positions. Unit prices are an extreme example of convex price functions.
Sortable prices. Finally, we consider sortable price functions. A list Π = (π 1 , π 2 , . . .) of price functions is called sortable if for each two voters v i , v j ∈ V with the same preference order (that is, for each two voters v i and v j such that ≺ i = ≺ j ) it holds that ∀1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m − 2 : π i (ℓ) > π j (ℓ) =⇒ π i (ℓ + 1) > π j (ℓ + 1). Informally, this means that one can sort each set V ′ of voters having the same preference order so that the prices of shifting the preferred candidate by each ℓ positions are nondecreasing along the corresponding sorted order of V ′ . Many natural price function families are sortable. For example, a list of exponential functions of the form π i (ℓ) = a ℓ i (where each voter v i may have an individual base a i ) is sortable. A list of polynomials of the form π i (ℓ) = a i · ℓ b (where the exponent b is the same for the voters having the same preference order but each voter v i may have an individual coefficient a i ) is sortable as well.
Given an election E = (C, V ), we write Π all to mean the set of all possible price functions for this election, Π convex to mean the set of the lists of convex price functions, Π unit to mean the set of the lists of unit price functions, Π 0/1 to mean the set of the lists of all-or-nothing price functions, and Π sort to mean the set of all sortable lists of price functions. We observe the following straightforward relations between these sets (also see the Hasse diagram in Figure 1 ). Proposition 1. For each given election, the following relations hold between the families of price functions:
Parameterizations by Solution Cost Measures
In this section we present our results for parameters measuring the solution cost, i.e., for the number of unit shifts, for the number of voters affected by at least one shift, and for the budget. It turns out that parameterization by the number of unit shifts tends to lower complexity (FPT algorithms for Borda and Maximin and W[1]-hardness for Copeland) than parameterization by the number of affected voters (W[2]-hardness). The case of parameterization by the budget lies in between, and the complexity depends on each particular price function family.
Unit Shifts
Borda Shift Bribery and Maximin Shift Bribery parameterized by the number t of unit shifts in the solution are in FPT for arbitrary price functions. The reason is that in these cases it is easy to isolate a small number of candidates on which one needs to focus. More precisely, we can shrink the number of candidates as well as the number of voters to be bounded by functions in t (in effect, achieving a partial kernelization [8] ). Theorem 1. Borda Shift Bribery parameterized by the number t of unit shifts is in FPT for arbitrary price functions. The running time of the algorithm is O * ((2 t · (t + 1) · t) t ).
Proof. Let I = (E = (C, V ), Π, p, B) be an input instance of Borda Shift Bribery for which we seek a shift action that uses at most t unit shifts. Our algorithm iterates over all possible number t ′ with 0 ≤ t ′ ≤ t, which we interpret as the exact number of shifts used in the solution.
Under the Borda rule, applying a shift action that uses t ′ unit shifts increases the score of p to exactly score E (p) + t ′ . This means that irrespective of which shift action with t ′ unit shifts we use, if some candidate c has score at most score E (p) + t ′ in election E, then after applying the shift action, p will certainly have score at least as high as c. On the contrary, if in election E some candidate c has score greater than score E (p) + t ′ , then a successful shift action must ensure that c loses at least score E (c) − (score E (p) + t ′ ) points. Since every unit shift decreases the score of exactly one candidate, it follows that if there is a successful shift action that uses exactly t ′ shifts, then the set C(t ′ ) := {c ∈ C \ {p} | score E (c) > score E (p) + t ′ } has at most t ′ elements. Our algorithm first computes the set C(t ′ ). If |C(t ′ )| > t ′ , then the algorithm skips the current iteration and continues with t ′ ← t ′ + 1.
By the above argument, we can focus on a small group of candidates, namely on C(t ′ ). Now we will show that we can also focus on a small group of voters. For each subset C ′ of C(t ′ ) and for each number j, 0 ≤ j ≤ t ′ , we compute a subset V j C ′ of t ′ voters v such that: i) if we shift p by j positions in v's preference order, then p passes each candidate from C ′ and j − |C ′ | other candidates from C \ C(t ′ ), and ii)
v∈V j C ′ π v (j) is minimal. If there are several subsets of voters that satisfy these conditions, then we pick one arbitrarily.
If there is a shift action #» s that uses exactly t ′ unit shifts and has price at most B, then there is a shift action #» s ′ that uses exactly t ′ shifts, has price at most B, and affects only the voters in V (t ′ ). To see this, assume that there is a voter v i ∈ V (t ′ ) and a number j such that #» s shifts p by j positions in v i . Let C ′ be the set of candidates from C(t ′ ) that p passes if shifted j positions in v i . By definition of V j C ′ and by simple counting arguments, there is a voter
. Thus, if in #» s we replace the shift by j positions in v i by a shift of j positions in v k , then we still get a successful shift action using exactly t ′ shifts and with price no greater than that of #» s . We can repeat this process until we obtain a successful shift action of cost at most B that affects the voters in V (t ′ ) only.
In effect, to find a successful shift action that uses at most t ′ unit shifts, it suffices to focus on the voters from V (t ′ ). The cardinality of V (t ′ ) can be bounded by
Since in the preference order of each voter in V (t ′ ) we can shift p by at most t ′ positions and we can do so for at most t ′ voters, there are at most |V (t ′ )| t ′ shift actions that we need to try. We can consider them all in
Using the ideas of the previous proof, we can transform a given election into one that includes only f (t) candidates and g(t) voters, where f and g are two computable functions. In this way, we obtain a so-called partial problem kernel [8, 33] . It is a partial problem kernel only since the prices defined by the price function Π and the budget are not necessarily bounded by a function of t.
Theorem 2. An instance of Borda Shift Bribery parameterized by the number t of unit shifts can be reduced to an equivalent instance with the same budget, and with O(t 4 ·2 t ) candidates and O(t 3 · 2 t ) voters.
Proof. By the proof of Theorem 1, we know that we only need to focus on a subset C crit of candidates whose size is bounded by a function of the parameter t. This set C crit is defined as follows:
the number of candidates whose scores are greater than score E (p) + t ′ is at most t ′ ; otherwise it will not be possible to decrease the score of every of those candidates by at least one within t ′ unit shifts, thus,
If n ≤ t 3 · 2 t , then we simply set V crit := V to be the set of all voters. Otherwise, from the previous proof it follows that we only need to focus on a small group of voters from the following set
where V (t ′ ) is defined as in the proof of Theorem 1. Briefly put, V (t ′ ) consists of the voters such that if we shift p in some of their preference orders by a total of t ′ positions, then we may make p a winner. Since we only need to compute t t ′ =0 V (t ′ ) when n ≥ t 3 · 2 t , it follows that V crit can be computed in polynomial time using the straightforward algorithm in the previous proof.
Clearly
The remaining task now is to construct an election containing all the candidates from C crit and the voters from V crit along with their price functions such that the election size is still bounded by a function in t.
We construct the candidate set C new of the new election as follows: We introduce a dummy candidate d i for every candidate c i ∈ C crit . This dummy candidate will be used to realize the original score difference between p and every candidate from C crit . We denote the set of all these dummy candidates as D.
For each voter v i ∈ V crit , we need to "replace" the candidates in his or her original preference order that do not belong to C crit but that are still "relevant" for the shift action. Let C i be the set of candidates from C crit that are ranked ahead of p by voter v i , that is,
We introduce a new set F j of dummy candidates whose size equals the number of irrelevant candidates that rank ahead of p by no more than t positions. That is,
The new voter set V consists of two blocks:
1. The first block is constructed to maintain the score difference between p and any candidate c j ∈ C crit in the original election. To this end, let s j be this score difference. We introduce s j pairs of voters with the preference orders point-pair(p, ∅, c j , d j , C new \ {p, c j , d j }, ·) (see Section 2.2 for the definitions). Note that the two preference orders that are specified by point-pair() will cause c j to have two points more than d j and one point more than any other candidate, including p. We set their price for the first unit shift to B + 1.
2. The second part is constructed to "maintain" the important part of the voters from V crit . That is, for each voter v i ∈ V crit , we set his or her new preference order to be v i :
where C i ∪ F i corresponds to the order of the candidates in v i 's original preference order and the price function remains unchanged. We also add a dummy voter v ′ i with the reverse preference order of v i and we set his or her price for shifting p by the first position to B + 1.
The size of the newly constructed voter set
The equivalence of the two instances can be verified as follows: The newly added dummy candidates, either from D or from F i have at most the same score as p. Each candidate c j ∈ C crit has exactly s j points more than p. Since it will be too expensive to bribe the voters from the first block or the dummy voters v ′ i (B + 1 budget for one unit shift), the only possibility of shifting p within the budget B is to bribe the voters who come from the original election and who have the "same" preference orders up to renaming of the candidates that do not belong to C crit .
The fixed-parameter tractability result for Maximin Shift Bribery follows by using a similar approach as in Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. Maximin Shift Bribery parameterized by the number t of unit shifts is in FPT for arbitrary price functions. The running time of the algorithm is O * ((2 t · (t + 1) · t) t ).
Proof. Let I = (E = (C, V ), Π, p, B) be an input instance of Maximin Shift Bribery. Suppose that, altogether, we are allowed to shift p by at most t positions. Under Maximin, such a shift can make p gain at most t points. Just similar to the case of Borda in Theorem 1, our algorithm iterates over all possible numbers t ′ with 0 ≤ t ′ ≤ t, which we interpret as the exact number of points that p gains after a successful shift action with t unit shifts and then, in each iteration, executes the following algorithm.
For
then we have to shift p to pass c in some preference orders. Since in every unit shift p passes exactly one candidate, a counting argument shows that if there are more than t − t ′ + 1 candidates c with N E (p, c) < score E (p) + t ′ , then there is no successful shift action that uses at most t ′ unit shifts. Thus the set
then the algorithm skips the current iteration and continues with t ′ ← t ′ + 1.
By the above argument, it suffices to focus on a small set of candidates: the set C(t ′ ). Using the same reasoning as in Theorem 1 for Borda voting, it also suffices to focus on a subset V (t ′ ) of at most 2 t · (t + 1) · t voters (we can compute this set in a way analogous to that for Borda voting). Since we can use at most t unit shifts and, thus, we can affect at most t voters, there
shift actions that we have to try. We can do so in FPT time.
Using an analogous approach to construct an equivalent election as for Theorem 2, we can obtain the following. Corollary 1. An instance of Maximin Shift Bribery parameterized by the number t of unit shifts can be reduced to an equivalent instance with the same budget, and with O(t 4 ·2 t ) candidates and O(t 3 · 2 t ) voters.
For Copeland, we do not get FPT membership, but we show W[1]-hardness even for unit prices and for all-or-nothing prices, which implies hardness for each of our price function families.
Theorem 4. Copeland Shift Bribery parameterized by the number of unit shifts is W[1]hard for each price function family that we consider.
Proof. We first show the result for all-or-nothing prices which, by Proposition 1, also covers the case of convex prices, sortable prices, and arbitrary price functions. In the second part, we deal with unit prices.
All-or-nothing prices. For the sake of completeness, fix some rational number α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, for the Copeland "tie breaking"; we will see later that we will not use α since the number of voters in the constructed instance is odd.
We give a reduction from Clique parameterized by the clique size. Let G = (V (G), E(G)) be our input graph and let k be the clique size that we seek (we assume k > 1). Let n = |V (G)| and m = |E(G)|. Without loss of generality, assume that n is odd and that n > 6 (both assumptions can be realized by adding several isolated vertices to the graph).
We construct an election E = (C, V ) as follows. First, we set the available budget B to be k · (k − 1)/2. We let C = V (G) ∪ {p, d} ∪ D, where p is our preferred candidate, d is the unique winner in E, and D is a set of 2n dummy candidates. Note that we use V (G) to denote both the vertex set and a subset of the candidates. However, given an element in V (G) we will always make it clear whether we mean a vertex or a candidate.
We form V so that |V | is odd and the following holds:
i) For each edge e = {x, y} in E(G), there are two voters v e with preference order
and v ′ e with the reversed ordering of v e . They have all-or-nothing price functions π e , π ′ e such that π e (0) = 0 and π e (j) = 1 for each j > 0 and π ′ e (j) = B + 1 for each j ≥ 0. We
ii) There is a set V struct of polynomially many voters who implement the following results of head-to-head contests (this indeed can be done by applying the classic McGarvey's theorem [39] ): Each candidate in V (G) wins head-to-head contests against p (by 2k − 3 voters' preference orders) and against d (by one voter's preference order). Candidate d wins headto-head contests against all candidates in D (by one voters' preference order). Candidate p wins head-to-head contests against 2n − k − 1 candidates in D and loses the remaining ones (by one preference order); p also wins the head-to-head contest against d (by one preference order). Each candidate in V (G) ∪ D wins exactly half of the head-to-head contests against the other members of V (G) ∪ D (i.e., each member of V (G) ∪ D wins head-to-head contests against exactly ⌊3n/2⌋ other members of V (G) ∪ D; recall that n is odd).
A formal definition of the preference orders of voters in V struct reads as follows. Let D 1 ⊆ D be a subset of k + 1 (arbitrary) candidates.
a) There is one voter with preference order V (G) ∪ D ≻ p ≻ d.
b) There are (k − 2) pairs of voters with preference orders
c) There are two voters with preference orders
d) There are two voters with preference orders
Also refer to Section 2.2 for the construction of preference orders half-seq1 and half-seq2.
Finally, each voter in V struct has all-or-nothing price function π such that π(0) = 0 and π(j) = B + 1 for each j > 0.
Note that due to the budget, we can only afford to bribe the voters in V edges . Prior to any bribery, p has 2n − k points, d has 2n points, and each other candidate has at most ⌊3n/2⌋ + 2 points. This means that d is the unique winner of E. We claim that there is a shift action #» s such that Π( #» s ) ≤ B and p is a winner of shift(E, #» s ) if and only if G has a clique of order k.
Assume that there is a successful shift action that ensures p's victory. Given our price functions, we can bribe up to k(k − 1)/2 voters in V edges , in each case to shift p by two positions to the top. Further, it is clear that a successful shift action must ensure that p obtains k additional points (it is impossible to decrease the score of d). This means that there is some set Q ⊆ V (G) with at least k candidates such that p passes each candidate from Q at least k − 1 times (if x ∈ Q and p passes x in k − 1 preference orders, then the value N E (x, p) − N E (p, x) changes from 2k − 3 to −1 and p wins the head-to-head contest against x). Given our budget, we can altogether shift p by t = k(k − 1) positions (each two positions correspond to an edge in G; t is the value of our parameter). Thus Q contains exactly k candidates, in each unit shift p passes one of them, and p passes each candidate from Q exactly k − 1 times. This is possible if and only if candidates in Q correspond to a clique in G.
On the contrary, if Q is a set of k vertices from V (G) that form a clique, then shifting p forward in B preference orders from V edges that correspond to the edges of the graph induced by Q ensures p's victory.
Unit prices. The above argument can be adapted to the case of unit prices. The key trick is to insert sufficiently many "filler" candidates directly in front of p in the preference orders of some voters who are not intended to be affected. This simulates the effect of all-or-nothing prices.
We again reduce from Clique parameterized by the order of the clique. The budget B is set to 3k · (k − 1)/2. We use the same notation for the input instance (G, k) of Clique. Without loss of generality, we assume that (n + m) is odd. We set the candidate set C to be
1. p is our preferred candidate, 2. d will be the unique winner in the constructed election E, 3. D 1 is a set of 4(m + n) − (k · (k − 1)/2 + k + 1) dummy candidates, 4. D 2 is a set of k · (k − 1)/2 + k + 1 dummy candidates, 5. F := F 1 ∪ F 2 consists of two sets of B "filler candidates" each, and 6. R := {q e | e ∈ E(G)} is a set of |E(G)| "edge candidates".
The filler candidates are used to simulate the affect of prices higher than the budget B by forming a "wall" of B candidates in front of p against which p wins anyway. The edge candidates together with a budget blow-up of k · (k − 1)/2 in the score difference between d and p are used to enforce that one has to shift p to the top position whenever one bribes a voter.
We form the voter set V as follows:
that is, v ′ e has the reversed preference order of v e . Let V edges be the set of all voters v e . ii) Add one voter with preference order
iii) Add two voters with preference orders (the boldfaced parts highlight the parts in the two voters that do not occur reversed.)
iv) Add k − 2 pairs of voters with preference orders
For each candidate x ∈ A, add one pair of voters with preference orders (see Section 2.2 for the definitions of half-seq1 and half-seq2)
One can check that the score difference between p and the unique winner d is k + k · (k − 1)/2, see Table 2 for details. Now, observe that with budget B, p can only gain any additional points by defeating candidates from V (G) ∪ R and by passing candidates in the preference orders of the voters in V edges (the candidates from F block all other possibilities). Since in the election E, each vertex candidate c i ∈ V (G) wins against p by 2k − 3 voters and each edge candidate q e wins against p by 1 voter, the only possibility for p to gain at least k · (k − 1)/2 additional points (within budget B) is to win against k · (k − 1)/2 candidates from R. This means that for every successful shift action there is some set E ′ ⊆ E(G), |E ′ | = k · (k − 1)/2 such that p was shifted to the top position in the preference order of each the voter v e , e ∈ E ′ . To achieve this, the whole budget must be used. To gain the additional k points (not from contests against candidates from R), p must have been shifted in front of k vertex candidates k − 1 times each. This is only possible if G[E ′ ] induces a clique of size k. candidate head-to-head contests won against 
Number of Affected Voters and Budget
For the number of affected voters, Shift Bribery is W[2]-hard for each of Borda, Maximin, and Copeland α , and this is true for each family of price functions that we consider: The result for all-or-nothing prices follows almost directly from the NP-hardness proofs due to Elkind et al. [23] (their reductions have to be adapted to work for Set Cover rather than its specialized variant, X3C, but this can be done quite easily). To obtain the result for unit prices, with some effort, it is still possible to carefully modify their proofs, maintaining their main ideas. Our proofs are included in A.
Theorem 5. Borda, Maximin, and Copeland Shift Bribery parameterized by the number of affected voters are W[2]-hard for each price function family that we consider.
When we parameterize Shift Bribery by the available budget, the results fall between those from Section 4.1 and Theorem 5. In essence, the hardness proofs for all-or-nothing prices carry over from the number of affected voters case to the budget case (and this implies hardness for arbitrary prices and sortable prices), while the results for the number of unit shifts carry over to the setting with convex/unit prices.
The hardness results translate because in the construction for all-or-nothing prices behind Theorem 5 the budget equals the parameter value "solution size" of the Set Cover instance from which we reduce. The FPT results parameterized by the number of unit shifts translate because for convex/unit prices the budget is an upper bound on the number of possible unit shifts. For Copeland Shift Bribery with unit prices, the budget equals the number of unit shifts in the reduction behind Theorem 4. This implies the following corollary. 
Parameterizations by Election-Size Measures
In this section we consider Shift Bribery parameterized by either the number of candidates or the number of voters. Elections with few candidates are natural in politics (for example, there is typically only a handful of candidates in presidential elections) and elections with few voters arise naturally in multiagent systems (for example, Dwork et al. [21] suggested election-based methods for aggregating results from several web search engines; see also the work of Brandt et al. [11] and of Chen et al. [16] for further results and motivation regarding elections with few voters).
Number of Voters
Let us now consider Shift Bribery parameterized by the number of voters. We have not found FPT algorithms for our rules in this setting, but we did find a general FPT-approximation scheme. The idea of our algorithm is to use a scaling technique combined with a brute-force search through the solution space. The scaling part of the algorithm reduces the range of prices and then the brute-force search finds a near-optimal solution. Theorem 6. Let R be a voting rule for which winner determination parameterized by the number n of voters is in FPT. There is a factor-(1 + ε) approximation algorithm solving R Shift Bribery in time O * (⌈n/ε + 1⌉ n ) times the cost of R's winner determination.
Proof. Let R be our voting rule and let I = (C, V, Π, p) be an instance of the optimization version of R Shift Bribery. Further, let ε > 0 be the desired approximation parameter. We will show how to compute a (1 + ε)-approximate solution for I.
We will need the following notation. For a vector
is the shift action that shifts p in each voter v i 's preference order as much as possible, without exceeding the per-voter budget limit b i .
Let m = |C| and n = |V |. The algorithm works as follows. First, we guess a voter v i ∈ V and a number j ∈ [m]. We set π max = π i (j). We interpret π max as the cost of the most expensive shift within the optimal solution. (Note that there are only nm choices of v i and j). We set K = ε · π max /n and define a list Π ′ of n price functions as follows. For each v i ∈ V and j ∈ {0, . . . , m}, we set
We form an instance I ′ = (C, V, Π ′ , p). Note that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and each j, 0 ≤ j ≤ m, we have that if π i (j) ≤ π max then π ′ i (j) ≤ n/ε + 1. We compute (if there exists one) a lowest-cost shift action #» s ′ for I ′ that ensures p's victory and does not use shifts that cost n · (n + 1)/ε + 1. We can do so by considering all vectors
) and, if so, we store Π ′ -shift( #» b ). We take s ′ to denote the cheapest stored shift action (we make an arbitrary choice if there are several stored shift actions of the same cost; if there is no stored shift action then it means that our guess of π max was incorrect). This process requires considering O(⌈n/ε + 1⌉ n ) shift actions.
After trying each guess for π max , we return the cheapest successful shift action s ′ that we obtained. We claim that this shift action has cost at most (1 + ε) · OPT(I).
Consider an iteration where the guess of π max is correct. Let K, Π ′ , and s ′ be as in that iteration and let s be a lowest-cost successful shift action for I (i.e., p is an R-winner of shift(E, s) and Π(s) = OPT(I)). We have the following inequalities:
The first inequality follows because of the rounding in Π ′ , the second inequality follows because s ′ is optimal for I ′ , the third inequality follows because for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and each j, 0 ≤ j ≤ m, K · ⌈π i (j)/K⌉ ≤ π i (j) + K, and the final equality follows by the definition of K. Since π max ≤ OPT(I) and by the above inequalities, we have:
Thus the algorithm returns a (1 + ε)-approximate solution. Our estimates of the running time given throughout the analysis justify that the algorithm runs in FPT time.
For general price functions, finding an FPT algorithm parameterized by the number of voters seems challenging, but it might be easier if we restrict the class of price functions. Indeed, for the case of all-or-nothing price functions we can obtain a very simple FPT algorithm. Proposition 2. Let R be a voting rule for which winner determination parameterized by the number of voters is in FPT. R Shift Bribery parameterized by the number of voters is in FPT for all-or-nothing prices.
Proof. Note that with all-or-nothing prices, it suffices to consider shift actions where for each voter's preference order we either shift the preferred candidate to the top or do not shift him or her at all. Thus, given an election with n voters it suffices to try each of the 2 n shift actions of this form.
In contrast to Proposition 2, fixed-parameter tractability for other price functions is not obvious. Indeed, for Copeland we can show W[1]-hardness for unit prices, via a somewhat involved reduction from a variant of the Clique problem. Proof. We give a reduction from Multicolored Clique-a variant of Clique which, given an undirected graph G = (V (G), E(G)), a non-negative integer k ≥ 0, and a coloring col : V (G) → [k], asks whether G contains a size-k multicolored clique Q ⊆ V (G), that is size-k vertex subset Q ⊆ V (G) such that the vertices in Q are pairwise adjacent and have pairwise distinct colors. We assume in the following that G is regular, that is, all vertices have the same degree, and the coloring is proper, that is, there are no edges between vertices of the same color. Note that even this restricted variant of Multicolored Clique parameterized by the clique size k is W[1]-hard [38] .
Observe that in the given Multicolored Clique instance (G, k, col), a multicolored clique contains exactly one vertex of color i for each i ∈ [k]. We exploit this fact in our reduction which we now describe at high level: For each color i ∈ [k] there is a color-gadget consisting of two voters v 2i−1 and v 2i . Each possible combination of shifting p in the preference orders of these two voters will refer to a selection of one vertex of color i. Each edge in E(G) is represented by one candidate; we call all candidates representing edges edge candidates. In the constructed election, our preferred candidate p loses all head-to-head contests against the edge candidates and has a score difference of k 2 with the original winner d. With some technical gadget, in order to make p a winner, p has to win head-to-head contests against at least k 2 edge candidates after the shifting. Furthermore, to win in a head-to-head contest against the edge candidate representing edge {x, y}, one has to "select" x and y in the respective color-gadgets. Thus, if p can be made a winner, then the corresponding selected vertices in the color-gadgets form a multicolored clique. We now describe the construction in detail.
First, set n G = |V (G)| and m G = |E(G)|, and let ∆ be the vertex degree in the regular graph G, implying m G = ∆ · n G /2. Furthermore, for each i ∈ [k], let ℓ i denote the number of vertices with color i. We start with initially empty sets V of voters and C of candidates. First, add to C the preferred candidate p and the candidate d. Candidate d will be the unique winner in the original election. Then, we extend the set C of candidates by adding i) for each color i ∈ [k] and each index j ∈ [ℓ i + 1], add a set S 
ii) for each edge e ∈ E(G), add an edge candidate c e ; we say that c e corresponds to edge e. Denote by R edges the set of all edge candidates. For each color i ∈ [k] and each index j ∈ [ℓ i ], we denote by R (i) j the set of edge candidates corresponding to the edges that are incident to the jth vertex with color i. Accordingly, we define R (i)
iii) add three sets of dummy candidates, denoted by D 1 , D 2 , D 3 , each of size n 5 G . and v 2k+1 , v 2k+2 , v 2k+3 . The first 2k voters form the k color-gadgets as mentioned above. The last three voters are necessary to obtain the desired scores. We begin with the color-gadgets. For each color i ∈ [k], we first specify the "interesting" part of the preference orders of voters v 2i−1 and v 2i by setting
Note that both P 2i−1 as well as P 2i have exactly ℓ i · (3n 3 G + ∆) + 1 candidates. Having these "interesting" parts, we specify the preference orders of voters v 2i−1 and v 2i as
Let R ⊆ R edges be a set of k 2 arbitrary edge candidates and let R ′ := R edges \ R be the set consisting of the remaining edge candidates. To complete V , we set the preference orders of voters v 2k+1 , v 2k+2 , and v 2k+3 as
Finally, set the budget B := (n G + k) · (3n 3 G + ∆) and the election E := (C, V ). This completes the construction (recall that we consider unit prices).
Before showing the correctness of the construction we determine the score of each candidate. Recall that the score of candidate d in Copeland for odd number of voters is equal to the number of candidates against whom d wins the head-to-head contents. To this end, let c d ∈ D, let c u ∈ S ∪ F , and let c e ∈ R edges with e being an edge incident to the rth vertex of color i and the sth vertex of color j. The scores are:
Hence, candidate d is the unique winner with score |C| − ∆ · n G /2 + k 2 − 1 and p needs (n G + k) · n 3 G + k 2 additional points to become a winner. Observe that in each preference order, when d beats p, it is at least n 5 G > B positions ahead of p. Hence, during the shifting of p the score of d cannot be decreased, implying that p can only win by increasing its score. This can only happen if p wins against candidates in R edges ∪ S. Furthermore, note that for all c u ∈ S and all c e ∈ R edges , it holds that
In particular, this means that p has to pass c u in just one voter's preference order in order to win against c u . To win the contest against c e , however, p has to pass c e in at least four voters' preference orders. Furthermore, the number of selection candidates is much higher than the number of edge candidates. Hence, p has to be shifted over basically all selection candidates to obtain the necessary points. Because of the distribution of the selection candidates, it follows that the only way of winning against all selection candidates is to spend (ℓ i +1)·(3n 3 G +∆) shifts in each pair of voters v 2i−1 , v 2i . This means that for each color i, we can select exactly one vertex of index j ∈ [ℓ i ] such that p passes in v 2i−1 's and in v 2i 's preference orders all candidates from R (i) j , implying that p wins against all edge candidates with the corresponding edges incident to the jth vertex of color i. Thus, if p wins against k 2 edge candidates, then the corresponding edges describe a multicolored clique in G.
We now formalize this idea when proving the correctness of our construction: (G, k, col) is a yes-instance of Multicolored Clique if and only if (E, p, B) is a yes-instance of Copeland Shift Bribery with unit prices. 
This implies that p wins in shift(E, #» s ) against all selection candidates. Furthermore, note that for each edge e = {u i ji , u h j h } with u i ji , u h j h ∈ Q, p also passes c e in the preference orders of voters v 2i−1 , v 2i , v 2j−1 , and v 2j as c e ∈ R . Altogether p gains (n G + k) · n 3 G + k 2 additional points after the shifting and, hence, p is a winner in shift(E, #» s ). "⇐:" Let #» s = (s 1 , . . . , s 2k+3 ) be a shift action making p a winner in shift(E, #» s ). This means that p gains at least (n G + k) · n 3 G + k 2 points through the shifting. As p already wins in the original election E against all dummy candidates in D and as |D 1 | = |D 2 | = |D 3 | > B, by the construction of the preference orders, we can assume that p is shifted in no preference order from the last three voters, and that p is shifted at most ℓ i · (3n 3 G + ∆) positions in v 2i−1 's or v 2i 's preference order, that is, s 2k+1 = s 2k+2 = s 2k+3 = 0, s 2i−1 ≤ ℓ i · (3n 3 G + ∆), and s 2i ≤ ℓ i · (3n 3 G + ∆).
We next show that, for each color i there is at most one vertex of color i such that p is shifted in v 2i−1 's and in v 2i 's preference orders over some edge candidates corresponding to this vertex's incident edges. In other words, if p wins in shift(E, #» s ) against the edge candidates c e1 and c e2 with e 1 = {x 1 , y 1 } and e 2 = {x 2 , y 2 } such that x 1 and x 2 are both colored with i, then x 1 = x 2 . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that p wins in shift(E, #» s ) against the edge candidates c e1 and c e2 such that e 1 = {x 1 , y 1 }, e 2 = {x 2 , y 2 }, x 1 and x 2 are both colored with i, and x 1 = x 2 . A lower bound for s 2i−1 + s 2i under this assumption can be seen as follows. Recall that in order to make p a winner one must shift p over each selection candidate from S (i) · . This can only be done by shifting p at least once (in v 2i−1 or v 2i ) over each of
· . Furthermore, at least two sets of filler candidates (each containing 2n 3 G candidates and corresponding either to x 1 or to x 2 ) and the two edge candidates c e1 and c e2 have to be passed by p a second time. Hence,
Thus, the remaining budget B ′ is:
The first equation holds since s 2k+1 = s 2k+2 = s 2k+3 = 0, To see the second equation and the inequality apply the definitions of B ′ and B and the above discussed lower bound for s 2i−1 + s 2i . Next, observe that in order to win in shift(E, #» s ), p has to win head-to-head contests against at least |S| − m G selection candidates. This implies that for each j ∈ [k], at least (ℓ j + 1) · (3n 3 G + ∆) − m G unit shifts in the color-gadget for color j are needed. The number of required unit shifts sum up to:
To see the last inequality recall that m G = ∆ · n G /2 and k < n G and observe that ∆ · n 2 G /2 < ∆ · n 3 G /2 − ∆ + 2. Finally, it follows that the number of additional shifts needed to make p a winner exceeds the remaining budget B ′ ; a contradiction.
Next, we show how to construct a multicolored clique given the shift-action #» s that makes p a winner. Denote by X the set of edge candidates against whom p wins already in shift(E, #» s ), let E(X) be the corresponding set of edges, and let V (X) be the vertices incident to these edges, that is, V (X) = e∈E(X) e. We now prove that V (X) forms a multicolored clique of size k. We already showed above that for each pair e 1 = {x 1 , y 1 } ∈ E(X) and e 2 = {x 2 , y 2 } ∈ E(X) such that x 1 and x 2 are both colored with i it follows that x 1 = x 2 . Hence, V (X) contains at most one vertex of each color, implying that |V (X)| ≤ k. Even though we assume that p wins against all selection candidates in shift(E, #» s ), p has to further win against at least k 2 edge candidates in shift(E, #» s ) in order to have the same score as d and win the election. Hence, |E(X)| ≥ k 2 . Thus, V (X) forms a clique of size exactly k in G. Since for each color there is at most one vertex in V (X) and there are k colors and thus V (X) is multicolored.
Since Copeland rule is polynomial-time computable, the above W[1]-hardness result shows that unless unlikely complexity class collapses occur, it is impossible to improve Theorem 6 to speak of an exact FPT algorithm. Indeed, the FPT approximation scheme from Theorem 6 seems to be the best we can hope for, for the parameterization by the number of voters.
Number of Candidates
As opposed to almost all other (unweighted) election problems ever studied in computational social choice, for Shift Bribery (and for bribery problems in general) the parameterization by the number of candidates is one of the most notorious ones. In other election problems, the natural, standard attack is to give integer linear program (ILP) formulations and use Lenstra's algorithm [36] . For instance, this has been applied to winner determination [2] , control [25] , possible winner [7] , and lobbying [13] problems. This works because with m candidates there are at most m! different preference orders and we can have a variable for each of them in the ILP. However, in our setting this approach fails. The reason is that in bribery problems the voters are not only described by their preference orders, but also by their prices. This means that we cannot lump together a group of voters with the same preference orders anymore, and we have to treat each of them individually. Dorn and Schlotter [19] have already considered the complexity of swap bribery parameterized by the number of candidates. However, their proof implicitly assumes that each voter has the same price function and, thus, it implies that Shift Bribery (parameterized by the number m of candidates) is in FPT for unit prices, but not necessarily for the other families of price functions. Whenever the number of different prices or different price functions is bounded by some constant or, at least, by some function only depending on m, Dorn and Schlotter's approach can be adapted.
For the more general price function families, we were neither able to find alternative FPT attacks nor to find hardness proofs (which, due to the limited number of candidates one can use and the fact that the voters are unweighted, seem particularly difficult to design). However, as in the case of parameterization by the number of voters (Theorem 6), we can show that there is an FPT-approximation scheme for the number of candidates when the prices are sortable. Proof. Let I = (C, V, Π, p) be an instance of (the optimization variant of) R Shift Bribery with Π being sortable, and let ε > 0 be a rational number. We show how to compute a successful shift action #» s for I such that Π(s) ≤ (1 + ε) · OPT. Our algorithm will have FPT running time for the combined parameter number of candidates and ε.
Before we start with the algorithm, we describe a helpful interpretation of solutions for R Shift Bribery with sortable prices. We call a set of voters all having the same preference order a voter block. Let m ′ ≤ m! denote the number of voter blocks in our election. We assume that the voters from each voter block appear consecutively and are ordered according to the price of shifting p to the top position (if they did not, we could sort them in this way). Using the fact that the price function list Π in I is sortable, simple exchange arguments show that there is a successful minimum-cost shift action #» s such that for each two voters v i and v j from the same block, it holds that i < j implies s i ≥ s j . Informally, this means that for each two voters with the same preference order, one never shifts p farther in the preference order of the more expensive voter.
Based on the above observation, we can conveniently express shift actions for our election in an alternative way. We say that a stepwise shift action #» µ = (µ 1 1 , . . . , µ 1 m−1 , µ 2 1 , . . . , µ 2 m−1 , . . . , µ m ′ 1 , . . . , µ m ′ m−1 ) is a vector of natural numbers, such that for each x ∈ [m ′ ], µ x 0 , . . . , µ x m−1 describe the shifts p makes in the block x in the following way: for each y ∈ [m − 1], µ x y is the number of voters in the x'th block for whom we shift p by at least y positions. More precisely, we define s-shift(E, #» µ ) to be the election E ′ = (C, V ′ ) identical to E, except that p has been shifted forward in µ x y voters of block x by at least y positions. Moreover, a stepwise shift action
Informally, a stepwise shift action is valid if one never shifts p by at least y + 1 positions without first having it shifted by at least y positions. A stepwise shift action is successful if p is an R-winner in s-shift(E, #» µ ). Every valid stepwise shift action can be translated into a shift action.
The above notion is crucial for understanding our algorithm. Thus, let us give a concrete example (see Figure 2 ). Assume that we have four voters, all in the same voter block. The first one has price function π 1 (j) = j, the second one has price function π 2 (j) = 2 j − 1, the third one has price function π 3 (j) = 3j, and the fourth one has price function π 4 (j) = j 2 + j + 4. For #» b = (6, 4, 9, 0), Π-s-shift( #» b ) is a stepwise shift action (3, 2, 2, 0, . . .): We can spend the 6 units of budget on shifting p forward by at least one position and this suffices to shift p forward for the first, second, and third voter. Note that, the cost is actually 5 units. For these three voters, we have 4 units of budget to shift p further. This is enough to shift p one position up in the preference orders of the first and the second voter (the actual cost of this operation is 3). Finally, for these two voters, we have 9 units of budget to shift p forward by one more position. This costs 3 for both voters and so we, again, shift p forward by one more position in the preference orders of the first and second voter. Even though we have 6 units of budget left, we do not use them on anything (in particular, we do not try to spend them on the third voter). The stepwise budget distribution corresponding to the stepwise shift action is (5, 3, 5) .
be a vector (intuitively, the entries in this vector should sum up to the amount of money that we wish to spend). We define the stepwise shift action Π-s-shift(
is the largest number t x y such that the cost of shifting p in the preference orders of t x y voters of block x by y positions (provided that they have already been shifted by y − 1 positions) is at most b x y (and t x y ′ +1 ≤ t x y ′ , for all y ′ ∈ [m − 2]). Note that the last condition ensures that Π-s-shift( #» b ) is valid. It is not hard to verify that Π-s-shift( #» b ) can be computed in polynomial time.
We are now ready to sketch the idea behind the main component of our algorithm (we present Observe that at least one entry in #» b must be greater than or equal to B/(m ′ · (m − 1)) (that is, to the average value of the entries). Search simply guesses the correct entry and repeats this procedure recursively with the remaining budget. Doing this, it guesses the entries to which it allocates smaller and smaller chunks of the budget (perhaps adding funds to the entries that already received some part of the budget), until it distributes a "major part" of the budget (never in any entry exceeding the corresponding value from #» b ). Then, the algorithm turns to the approximation part: It simply increases every entry in the vector by whatever was left of the budget. In effect, we find a vector such that every entry matches or exceeds that of #» b but the total price is not much greater than B. The only problem with this approach is that we do not know OPT(I). However, we will see that trying a certain small number of different budget values B suffices.
We now move on to the formal proof. We will first show that steps. This means that there is a vector
is a successful stepwise shift action. Even ensuring that Π-s-shift( #» b ′′ ) is valid will not decrease any component below the corresponding value in Π-s-shift(
. Now we can compute an approximate solution for I as follows. We start by considering shift action Π-shift(0, . . . , 0) and output it if it is successful. Otherwise, we run Algorithm 1 for each budget (1 + ε) i , for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . and output the first successful shift action that it outputs.
Note that if the cost of some cheapest successful shift action for I is B, then after O(ln B) iterations the procedure above will find a budget B ′ such that B ≤ B ′ < (1 + ε) · B. For this B ′ , Algorithm 1 will output a successful shift action with cost at most (1 + ε) · B ′ ≤ (1 + ε) 2 · B = (1 + 2ε + ε 2 ) · B. This shows that our algorithm is indeed an approximation scheme. It remains to show that it runs in FPT time (parameterized by the number of candidates). To see this, it suffices to note that O(ln B) = O(ln(Π(m, . . . , m))) = O(|I|) and that Algorithm 1 runs in FPT time.
Adopting some of the ideas of the above proof, we obtain the following XP algorithm for Shift Bribery with arbitrary prices.
Theorem 9. Let R be a voting rule whose winner determination procedure is in XP when parameterized by the number m of candidates. R Shift Bribery parameterized by m is in XP for each price function family that we consider. The algorithm runs in time O * ((n m ) m! ) times the cost of R's winner determination.
Proof. Let R be a voting rule whose winner determination procedure is in XP when parameterized by the number of candidates. We give an XP algorithm for R Shift Bribery.
Let I = (C, V, Π, p) be an input instance of R Shift Bribery. Let n be the number of voters and let m be the number of candidates in E = (C, V ). Each voter has one of m! possible preference orders and we partition V into vectors V 1 , . . . , V m! of voters with the same preference orders. Our algorithm works as follows:
1. For each ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m!, guess a vector #» q ℓ = (q ℓ 0 , . . . , q ℓ m ) of nonnegative integers that sum up to V ℓ . For each guessed list of vectors do the following:
(a) Compute the cheapest shift action #» s such that for each ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m!, and for each j, 0 ≤ j ≤ m, there are exactly q ℓ j voters in V ℓ for whom we shift p by exactly j positions. If such a shift action does not exist then move on to another guess in the preceding step of the algorithm. (Below we describe precisely how to implement this step.) (b) If p is an R-winner of shift(E, #» s ) then store #» s as a successful shift action.
2. Return the cheapest stored successful shift action.
Since, in essence, the algorithm tries all interesting shift actions, it is clear that it is correct. We now show that it is possible to implement it to run in XP time with respect to the number of voters.
In the first step, the algorithm has O((n m ) m! ) possible guesses so we can try them all. However, it is not clear how to implement given vectors #» q 1 , . . . , # » q m! in step (1a). Let ℓ be some integer, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m!. We will show how to compute the part of #» s that implements #» q ℓ . We solve the problem by reducing it to an instance of a variant of Min Cost/Max Flow problem where, in addition to the standard formulation, we are also allowed to put lower bounds on the amount of flow traveling through some edges (we call these values demands; this problem is well-known to be polynomial-time solvable [1] ).
Let us rename the voters in V ℓ so that V ℓ = (v 1 , . . . , v r ) for some r ∈ N. We form the following flow network for Min Cost/Max Flow. We let the set N of vertices be {s, t} ∪ {v 1 , . . . , v r } ∪ {0, . . . , m}. Vertices s and t are, respectively, the source and the sink. Vertices v 1 , . . . , v r form the first layer in the flow network and correspond to the voters in V ℓ . Vertices 0, . . . , m form the second layer in the network and correspond to the extent to which p should be shifted (in a given group of voters). We have the following edges:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, there is an edge with unit capacity and zero cost from s to v i .
2. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ r and each j, 0 ≤ j ≤ m, there is an edge with unit capacity and cost π i (j) from v i to j (π i is v i 's price function).
3. For each j, 0 ≤ j ≤ m, there is an edge from j to t with capacity and demand q ℓ j and zero cost (the setting of capacity and demand means that we are interested in flows where there are exactly q ℓ j units of flow traveling from j to t).
There is a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a lowest-cost flow from s to t that satisfies the capacity and demand constraints of all the edges [1] . The constructed flow network is of polynomial size with respect to our input instance, so our algorithm indeed runs in XP time. Further, the flow from vertices {v 1 , . . . , v r } to vertices {0, . . . , j} defines the desired shift action in a natural way: If a unit of flow travels from some v i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r, to some j, 0 ≤ j ≤ m, then we shift p by j positions in v i . This completes the argument.
Conclusion
We have studied the parameterized complexity of Shift Bribery under the voting rules Borda, Copeland, and Maximin, for several natural parameters (either describing the nature of the solution or the size of the election) and for several families of price functions (arbitrary, convex, unit, sortable, and all-or-nothing). Our results confirmed the belief that the computational complexity depends on all three factors: the voting rule, the parameter, and the type of price function used. Our work leads to some natural follow-up questions. First, it would be interesting to resolve the complexity of Shift Bribery parameterized by the number of candidates and parameterized by the number of voters (for the case of Borda and Maximin). Further, one could study the problem for other voting rules. Going in the direction of the Margin of Victory type of problems, it would be interesting to study Destructive Shift Bribery, where we can push back the despised candidate to prevent him or her from being a winner. Finally, recently Chen et al. [15] introduced a model of affecting election outcomes by adding groups of voters to the election (this is an extension of a well-studied problem known as Control by Adding Voters [3, 32] ). It would be very interesting to consider Shift Bribery in the setting where one could affect multiple voters at the same time (for example, airing an advertisement on TV could affect several voters at the same time). We currently investigate some of these directions of research.
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A Proof of Theorem 5
In this appendix we present the omitted proof of Theorem 5. To this end, we split the proof in three propositions, each proposition covering one of the considered voting rules. In most cases the proofs of the propositions base on an idea already present in the literature (mostly in the paper of Elkind et al. [23] ), but they do include some additional insights. Proposition 3. Borda Shift Bribery parameterized by the number of affected voters is W[2]-hard for each price function family that we consider.
Proof. We consider Borda Shift Bribery for unit prices first. We give a parameterized reduction from Set Cover parameterized by the set cover size k. Let I = (U, S, k) be our input instance, where U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } and S = {S 1 , . . . , S m } is a collection of subsets of U, and k is a positive integer. We set the budget B = k · (n + 1) and form a set of candidates C = {p, d, g} ∪ U ∪ F , where F is a set of "filler" candidates, F = {f 1 , . . . , f 2k·(n+1)+2 }. We form a set V of voters as follows: i) We form a subset V sets of voters as follows (note that this subset will be useful in the proof for the case of Copeland). For each set S i in S we create two voters, v 2i−1 and v 2i . Voter v 2i−1 has preference order
where F i is an arbitrarily chosen set of n − |S i | candidates from F . Voter v 2i has the reversed preference order of v 2i−1 . Note that each pair of voters v 2i−1 , v 2i , gives each candidate |C| − 1 points.
ii) For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we add B+1 pairs of voters with preference orders from point-pair(p, ∅, u i , g, C\ {u i , g, p, d}, d) (see Section 2.2 for the definition) to the voter set V . Note that, with two preference orders from point-pair(p, ∅, u i , g, C \ {u i , g, p, d}, d), u i receives |C| points, g receives |C| − 2 points, and each remaining candidate in C \ {u i , g} receives |C| − 1 points. In both preference orders, there are |C| − 2 candidates between p and d.
iii) Let F ′ be an arbitrary size-(B + 1) subset of F and let z ∈ F \ F ′ be an arbitrary candidate. We add B + k pairs of voters with preference orders of point-pair(p, F ′ , d, g, C \ ({p, g, d, z} ∪ F ′ ), z) to the voter set V .
Since we are dealing with unit price functions, each voter has price function π(j) = j. By routine calculation, it is easy to verify that there is a value L such that the candidates in election E = (C, V ) have the following scores:
• score E (p) = L,
• score E (d) = L + B + k,
• for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, score E (u i ) = L + B + 1, and where each F i contains an arbitrarily fixed subset of n − |S i | candidates from F , and v 2i has preference order which is the revers of v 2i−1 's.
ii) We create a set V struct of voters by including the following group of voters: a) we include k voters with preference order
c) we include a single voter with preference order g ≻ U ≻ X 1 ≻ p ≻ X 2 ≻ d, and d) we include 2k voters with preference order
We set V = V sets ∪ V struct , and E = (C, V ). Each voter has a unit price function and we set the budget B to be k · (n + 1). We claim that the constructed Maximin Shift Bribery instance is a yes-instance if and only if I is a yes-instance of Set Cover. However, before we prove this fact, let us calculate the scores of the candidates in the election E.
In Table 3 we give the values of the function N E (·, ·) for the just constructed election (for the values of the function among candidates from the set U ∪ F we use the trivial upper bound, m + 4k). Note that for each x, y ∈ C, the voters from V sets contribute value m to N E (x, y) and the remaining value comes from the voters in V 2 . Based on the function N E , we calculate the scores of the candidates in our election:
• score E (p) = m + k,
• score E (g) = m + k,
• score E (d) = m + 2k,
• for each u i ∈ U, score E (u i ) = m, and
• for each f j ∈ F , score E (f j ) = m.
Thus, prior to any bribery, d is the unique winner.
We show that (U, S, k) is a yes-instance for Set Cover if and only if the constructed Maximin Shift Bribery instance is a yes-instance.
"⇒": Suppose without loss of generality that S 1 , . . . , S k cover the universe U. Then, it suffices for each voter in the set V ′ = {v 2i−1 | 1 ≤ i ≤ k} to shift p to the top position. This leads to p passing g for k times and to p passing each candidate from U at least once. In effect, the score of p increases to m + 2k, and p and d are tied winners. Further, doing so costs at most n · k + k: In each of the at most k preference orders where we shift p, we shift p by n + 1 positions.
"⇐": Assume that there is a shift-action #» s such that applying #» s ensures that p is a (co)winner. We can assume that #» s shifts p only in some preference orders of the voters in the set V ′ = {v 2i−1 | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. This is so because in all the other preference orders, p is ranked just below a group of at least B candidates from F and for each candidate f i ∈ F , we have N E (p, f i ) = m + 2k; f i is not blocking p from gaining additional k points and, since we can affect at most k voters, p can get at most k additional points. Further, voters in the set V ′ rank p ahead of d, and so by applying #» s we certainly cannot lower the score of d. This means that #» s must ensure that p's score increases to at least m + 2k. This is possible only if #» s affects exactly k voters, in each vote affected by #» s candidate p passes g, and p passes each candidate from U at least once. This means that #» s shifts p to the first position in the preference orders of k voters from V ′ , this costs exactly B (shifting p to the top position in the preference order of a single voter from V ′ has price n + 1), and the voters for which #» s shifts p correspond to the sets from S that cover U.
The above construction covers the case of unit price functions. By Proposition 1, this also applies to convex price functions, sortable price functions, and arbitrary price functions. For the all-or-nothing price functions, we can adapt the above proof in the same way in which we have adapted the proof for the case of Borda, see proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 5. Copeland Shift Bribery parameterized by the number of affected voters is W[2]-hard for each price function family that we consider.
Proof. We reduce from Set Cover parameterized by the set cover size. Our reduction is similar to that for the case of Borda and, in particular, we use the same notation for the input instance I of Set Cover, we form the same candidate set C = {p, d, g}∪U (see the proof for Proposition 3), and we use the subset V sets of voters. However, we extend V sets to a complete set of voters in a different way, described below. Let r = 2k · (n + 1) + 3 be the number of candidates in the set F ′ := F ∪ {g}. i) We introduce a single voter p ≻ d ≻ U ≻ F ′ (the reason for doing so is to have an odd number of voters, so the proof will work for all values of α).
ii) Using a modified McGarvey's construction (see below), we introduce voters to ensure the following results of head-to-head contests among the candidates: a) Candidate d defeats each candidate in U by one preference order; d defeats p by 2k − 1 preference orders, and d defeats by one preference order r − n (arbitrarily chosen) candidates from F ′ (the remaining candidates from F ′ defeat d by one preference order).
b) Candidate p defeats by one preference order r − n arbitrarily chosen candidates from F ′ and loses to the remaining n of them by 2k + 1 preference orders. Candidate p loses by one preference order to each candidate from U. c) For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, u i defeats by one preference order all candidates u j such that i > j. Candidate u i defeats by one preference order r − (i − 1) arbitrarily chosen candidates from F ′ , and loses to the remaining i − 1 candidates from F ′ . d) Each candidate in F ′ defeats by one preference order at most ⌊|F ′ |/2⌋ candidates from F ′ (an easy way of constructing a set of results of head-to-head contests that achieves this effect and a proof that this way we can set the results of all head-to-head contests among the candidates from F ′ is given in the work of Faliszewski et al. [26, discussion after their Lemma 2.3]).
Before we explain what we mean by modified McGarvey's construction, let us first calculate the scores that the candidates would have if we formed election E = (C, V ) according to the above description. We would have:
• score E (p) = r − n,
• score E (d) = n + r − n + 1 = r + 1,
• each candidate u i in U would have score E (u i ) = i − 1 + r − (i − 1) + 1 = r + 1, and
• each candidate f in F would have score E (f ) ≤ 1 + 1 + n + r/2 ≤ r (because k > 2).
Let us now describe what we mean by modified McGarvey's construction. McGarvey's theorem [39] is as follows. Assume that we are given given a set of candidates and a set of results of head-to-head contests (specified for each pair x, y of candidates by the number M (x, y) of voters that prefer x over y minus the number of voters that prefer y over x; either all values M (x, y) are odd or all are even). Then, we can compute in polynomial time (with respect to the number of candidates, the number of given voters, and the sum of the values M (x, y)) an election E such that for each two candidates x, y we have N E (x, y) − N E (y, x) = M (x, y).
It is standard to prove McGarvey's theorem using a construction that introduces pairs of voters (for candidate set C) with preference orders of the form x ≻ y ≻ C − {x, y} , and ←−−−−−−−− C − {x, y} ≻ x ≻ y. We use this construction with the modification that we ensure that in each preference order p and d are always separated from each other by at least k · (n + 1) candidates. (For example, it suffices to ensure that p and d are always ranked first, second, last, or second to last, and that if p is ranked first or second then d is ranked last or second to last, and the other way round).
We can now continue our proof. We set budget B := k · (n + 1) and we use unit price functions for all the voters. We claim that there is a cover of U by at most k sets from S if and only if our instance of Copeland Shift Bribery is a yes-instance. "⇒": Assume without loss of generality that S 1 , . . . , S k cover the universe U. Indeed, if we shift p to the top position in those preference orders from {v 2i−1 | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, then p will pass d k times (in effect winning the head-to-head contest against d), p will pass each candidate from U at least once (in effect winning head-to-heat contests with all of them), and this shift action will have price exactly B. In effect, the score of p will increase to r + 1, the scores of candidate in U ∪ {d} will decrease to r, and p will be the unique winner.
"⇐": Now assume that our instance of Copeland Shift Bribery is a yes-instance and let #» s be a shift-action that involves at most k voters, has price at most B, and ensures p's victory. Note that by shifting p in at most k preference orders, p can win at most n + 1 additional head-to-head contests (only those with the candidates in U ∪ {d}). If, after applying #» s , p does not win the contest against d, then p's score is at most r and d's score remains r + 1 (so p is not a winner). Thus we know that p must win the head-to-head contest against d and, so, p must pass d in at least k preference orders. Since all the voters other than those in V ′ = {v 2i−1 | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} either already prefer p to d, or rank d ahead of more than B other candidates that themselves are ranked ahead of p, #» s must involve exactly k voters from V ′ , and for each preference order of the voters from V ′ where p is shifted, p must be shifted to the top (because otherwise p would not pass d). Since, in addition, p must pass each candidate u i from U at least once (to win the head-to-head contest with u i , to obtain the final score of r + 1), it follows that the voters for which #» s shifts p to the top position correspond to the sets from S that form a cover of U.
The above proof covers the case of unit price functions, convex price functions, sortable price functions, and arbitrary price functions. It is easy to adapt it to work for all-or-nothing prices in the same way in which the proof for Borda was adapted.
